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13
Reform Proposal: Uniform
Source Withholding Tax
and Global Profit Split
Introduction
Previous chapters have discussed the existing international tax system, its application to electronic commerce, its main problems, and various proposals to
deal with those problems. This chapter proposes a coherent, simpler system of
taxing international income in an integrated, digital world.
This chapter first presents a case for a re-evaluation of the fundamental
concepts and principles of international taxation in light of the challenges posed
by electronic commerce. It also argues that inter-nation fairness should be the
primary policy objective of any improvement(s) to the present system and that
single taxation should be the guiding principle.
The chapter then proposes a system that consists of a uniform withholding
tax (UWT) at source on portfolio income, and a global profit-split (GPS) method
for the allocation of cross-border business profits. The proposal is based on
some tried and true ideas: source withholding tax has been levied in most countries from the very beginning of international taxation, and formulary allocation
of profit was widely practised in the world until the 1940s and is currently used
in certain situations where traditional transfer-pricing methodologies do not
work well. Although the two elements complement each other in achieving
inter-nation fairness and ensuring single taxation of international income, they
can be introduced separately.
Most of this chapter discusses the technical design issues and policy assessment of the proposed UWT and GPS and evaluates whether each or both
proposals can be implemented from legal, political, and practical perspectives.

Re-Evaluation
The Need for Re-Evaluation
The need to re-evaluate the fundamental issues of international taxation arises
from the problems that are aggravated by the rise of electronic commerce. As
explained in previous chapters, these problems are not unique to electronic
commerce, so any solution lies in fundamental tax reform. The beginning of the
21st century, with an increasingly global economy, offers a golden opportunity
583
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to re-evaluate and reform the international tax system, which is largely a creature of the industrial age at the beginning of the 20th century.
Furthermore, it may be inevitable to revisit the rules of the game now that
the players are different. Other than the United States, the five jurisdictions in
this study were not active players at the table when the original international
tax order was developed.1 Canada and Japan came to the table subsequently.
China, Hong Kong, and Singapore are not yet at the table, nor are most of the
world’s nations. It is reasonable to expect that many countries, desiring to receive
their fair share of the fruits of the global economy, want to be at the table.
The need for re-evaluation has been advocated by numerous commentators.
Richard Bird writes that the “present [tax] treatment of international capital flows
is inefficient and inequitable, almost irrespective of how one defines those
words.”2 Jack Mintz3 and others4 foresee the eventual demise of corporate income tax unless something is done to salvage it. David Tillinghast echoes that
point by saying that reform efforts must be made because the alternative could
be a fundamental breakdown of the international tax system.5 Other commentators, however, are more cautious. For example, Michael Graetz writes:
[T]he international income tax system lurches from one perceived threat to
another: transfer pricing abuses yesterday, “harmful” tax competition and
under-reporting of portfolio capital income today, and who knows what
tomorrow. Despite the obvious strain, the wheels do not seem to be coming off, at least not yet. In fact, the international tax system has served
reasonably well; it has not proven a significant barrier to the international
flows of goods, services, labour, or capital, and may even have facilitated
such flows. This no doubt is why it has survived intact for so long.6

Nevertheless, Graetz argues that the time has come for a fundamental reexamination of the system of international taxation and the principles and concepts on which it is based.

Theoretical Foundation
As explained in chapter 2, the economic allegiance theory and benefit theory
provide a foundation for the current international tax system. Both theories
remain valid in the world of electronic commerce, and need to be reapplied in
order to give meaning to their original intent and scope.
According to the economic allegiance theory, the basis for determining a
country’s jurisdiction to tax international income is the taxpayer’s economic
allegiance to that country.7 Economic allegiance may be established by examining where wealth is acquired, located, and consumed and where the rights to
wealth are enforced. The League of Nations economists regarded the acquisition (or origin) of wealth and the residence (or domicile) of the owner who
consumes the wealth to be key factors. They imagined that both the origin of
wealth and residence of the owner would be determined by economic factors.
For example, the origin of wealth is to be considered in light of the original
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physical appearance of the wealth and its subsequent physical adaptations, transportation, direction, and sale. Under the economic allegiance theory, therefore,
both the country where income originates and the country where income is
consumed have the jurisdiction to tax the income.
The current system of international taxation (as embodied in the OECD
model8) fails to reflect fully the economic allegiance theory. This failure is
biased against source countries, because
• it deprives the country where business income originates of the jurisdiction
to tax the income, unless it is earned through a permanent establishment;
• it denies source-country taxation of royalties;
• it does not recognize consumption or place of sale as a factor in establishing jurisdictional nexus; and
• while limiting source-country taxation, it provides the residence country
with the residual right to tax income.
In order to overcome the bias against source countries, all four factors underlying economic allegiance should be employed in determining tax jurisdiction
so that a country where one of the factors is located is entitled to share in the
taxation of the income. In addition, the current place of residence (especially
for corporations) is not the equivalent of place of consumption as envisaged by
the League of Nations economists. Therefore, the place of consumption should
be given specific recognition in the allocation of tax jurisdictions. In the context of electronic commerce, this factor is crucial in ensuring that countries that
provide a consumer base are entitled to tax income earned by foreign vendors.
The bias against source countries also violates the benefit theory, because
taxpayers that benefit from the public services provided by source countries are
not required to pay taxes in those countries. The benefit theory posits that the
country that incurs expenditures in providing the infrastructure for incomeproducing activities is entitled to tax income from the activities.9 Income-earning
activity is viewed as a “joint venture” between taxpayers and the society in which
income is earned10—taxpayers benefit from the infrastructure, legal environment, and consumption base supported by expenditures incurred by both source
and residence countries, and are thus expected to contribute to the financing of
these expenditures.11 Countries that provide a market for products and services
and countries that provide a production base are entitled to tax profits from the
sale of the products or services.
The economic allegiance theory and benefit theory thus provide justifications for tax claims by both residence and source countries. Residence-based
tax claims are particularly strong in the case of investment income and income
earned by individuals, whereas source-based tax claims are strong in all cases,
especially in the case of business profits. The proposed uniform UWT on portfolio income and GPS for business profits overcome the bias against source
taxation and allow both residence and source countries to obtain a fair share of
the international tax base.
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Guiding Principles
International taxation is designed to deal with the fundamental question of how
countries share the taxation of international income. This question involves the
determination of the international tax base and the level of sharing between
countries. Ideally, international income should not be taxed either more or less
than income earned domestically, and the tax on international income should be
shared fairly by countries that are entitled to tax that income. In other words,
the guiding principles in international tax law should be the principle of single
taxation and inter-nation fairness.
Principle of Single Taxation
Under the principle of single taxation, “[I]ncome from cross-border transactions
should be subject to tax once (that is, neither more nor less than once).”12 This
principle incorporates the traditional goal of avoiding double taxation and current international efforts in preventing international undertaxation.13
The principle of single taxation does not necessarily mean that cross-border
income can be taxed in only one country (either the source or the residence country). Instead, such income may be taxable in both source and residence countries
as long as the total level of taxation does not exceed the level of taxation in the
residence country. The rate of source-based taxation should not exceed the rate
of the residence-based taxation so that both countries can share the taxation of
cross-border income without causing overtaxation.
The proposed UWT and GPS are consistent with the principle of single taxation because they ensure that portfolio income is not free of taxation worldwide
and profits from globally integrated businesses are allocated among countries in
accordance with a generally accepted formula.
Inter-Nation Fairness
What Does “Inter-Nation Fairness” Mean?
Inter-nation fairness requires that “fair shares” of the international tax base be
allocated among countries.14 It should be the primary objective of international
taxation and should override other policy objectives, such as capital export
neutrality, capital import neutrality, and inter-taxpayer equity, which are often
conflicting and unsatisfactory in theory and in practice.15
The advocacy of inter-nation fairness raises three questions:
1) What constitutes “fairness”?
2) What does this principle encompass?
3) Why should it be the primary policy objective of international taxation?
The meaning of “fairness” in the context of international taxation may be
controversial, because countries do not always see it in the same light. Dictionary meanings of the word “fair” include “free from dishonesty or injustice” and
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“that [which] is allowed to be done, given, etc. as under the rules of a game.”16
Tax fairness in public finance literature has a specific meaning—the distribution
of the tax burden among individuals,17 or inter-individual (taxpayer) fairness.
Inter-nation fairness means something more and something different.
In the context of this chapter, the notion of inter-nation fairness encompasses
four elements: tax entitlement, a fair level of source taxation, fair dealing among
nations, and the fair redistribution of international income among countries.
Therefore, as discussed in chapter 12, “inter-nation fairness” has a broader
meaning than the traditional notion of “inter-nation equity,” which is concerned
with only the first two elements.18
The first element, tax entitlement, deals with the question of which country
is entitled to share in the international tax base. Entitlement would be considered “fair” if a country that claims jurisdiction to tax international income has
made economic contributions to the earning of that income under the economic
allegiance theory or the benefit theory. In this sense, both residence and source
countries are entitled to claim tax jurisdiction.
The second element of inter-nation fairness is a fair level of source taxation.
This element concerns the level of sharing among jurisdictions, which is determined not only by the base but also by the rates. In general, tax rates should be
determined by domestic tax policy concerns, such as revenue needs, though
they would likely be affected by the principles of non-discrimination, international comity, or tax competition. In the case of business profits earned by
multinational enterprises (MNEs), the proposed GPS method would allocate a
share of the global income to each country according to a commonly accepted
formula. The source country would tax the allocated income at the same rate
applicable to resident taxpayers. In the case of portfolio income, the rate of
source withholding tax would be set so as to recognize the taxing rights of the
source country and allow fair sharing with residence countries, as well as help
curb non-taxation through the use of intermediary tax haven entities.
The third element of inter-nation fairness is fair dealing among nations.
While protecting its sovereignty, a nation would work cooperatively with other
nations toward the goal of a fair sharing of the international tax base. It would
discourage a “race-to-the-bottom” type of tax competition or a “beggar-thyneighbour” tax policy. Moreover, inter-nation fairness would require fairness in
the international tax policy process: the process would have to be opened up to
allow countries to participate.
The fourth element of inter-nation fairness is the fair redistribution of
international income among countries. Redistributive income taxation of taxpayers living in the same country on the basis of the ability-to-pay principle can
be justified by considerations of vertical equity and the declining marginal
utility of income.19 Globalization may have increased the need for inter-nation
redistribution of income.20 Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that “there appears to be
no sound theoretical reason to restrict redistribution to members of any single
tax jurisdiction.”21 According to Avi-Yonah, if there were a world taxing authority, it would be justified in redistributing wealth on a worldwide basis. Peggy
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Musgrave and Richard Musgrave also envision an inter-nation redistribution
system through the design of tax rates.22 Peggy Musgrave writes:
For instance, the tax share in profits earned by non-residents might be
allowed to rise inversely to the level of per capita income in [the source
jurisdiction] and directly in relation to per capita income in [the residence
jurisdiction]. Such a scheme would be of particular interest in the relation
between developed and developing countries.23

However, inter-nation redistribution of income has not been widely espoused,
even by proponents of inter-nation equity.24 No nation has ever made a genuine
commitment to worldwide equity.25 Graetz notes that in the absence of a world
government, the fact remains that “the freedom and independence, as well as
the economic welfare, of people varies from nation to nation.”26 He argues
against having a world government on the ground that it “would likely become
a dictatorship.”27
Given this author’s preference for an incremental approach to international
tax reform, the principle of inter-nation fairness underlying the current proposal
would not mandate worldwide redistributive income taxation, but would welcome it if the appropriate political climate existed.
Why Should Inter-Nation Fairness Be the Primary Policy Objective?
Inter-nation fairness should be the primary objective of international tax policy
for several reasons. The first reason is historical. The concern in removing the
“evils” of international double taxation while nations share the international tax
base was the original driving force for the international tax system. Inter-taxpayer
equity, although important for a particular country to decide whether to adopt
residence-based or source-based taxation, has never been a dominant concern in
the division of the tax base between countries. The reason is that inter-taxpayer
equity is limited by national boundaries, and, more important, it does not directly
speak to the players in the international tax “game”—nation states. Consequently,
inter-taxpayer equity has not been and cannot become the main objective or
guiding principle of international taxation.
Historically, capital export or import neutrality has not successfully influenced
world tax policy, even though much of the economic literature on international
taxation (especially in the United States) may be seen as attempting to exhort
the virtues of world efficiency as a goal of tax policy.28 A questionable exception might be the introduction of subpart F rules in the United States, because
this coincided with the perceived interests of both important public and private
sector players. This exception is questionable because, as pointed out by some
of those involved in enacting the subpart F rules,29 capital export neutrality had
little to do with the rules. Therefore, experience strongly suggests that internation fairness operates as a more critical element in international policy making.
The second reason is political. Treaty law is the result of negotiations
between countries. According to Bird and Mintz, real-world arguments are
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rarely about efficiency, but rather about what is perceived to be fair.30 The
existence of the UN model31 indicates the importance of this issue: developing
countries attempted to obtain a bigger share of the international tax base
through “collective bargaining” when they concluded that their share under the
OECD model was inadequate. Furthermore, national governments are primarily
accountable to their own citizens. It is unrealistic to ask a nation to choose
worldwide economic efficiency over the alternative of benefiting its own economic efficiency and residents.32
The third reason is pragmatic. Inter-nation fairness and the principle of
simplicity and administrative efficiency are not mutually exclusive. Improvement in simplicity may also effect improvement in inter-nation fairness. This
point will be argued further in the context of the proposed UWT and GPS.
Finally, inter-nation fairness respects the principle of sovereignty. While a
broadly defined inter-nation fairness concept provides a coherent guiding principle for the division of the tax base, it leaves the issue of distribution of tax
burdens within a country to be decided in accordance with domestic policy
objectives.

Reconceptualization
The current concepts of residence, characterization of income, source of income,
and permanent establishment have many problems, which have been identified
in chapter 12. Reconceptualization is thus necessary to retain the viability of
these concepts in the world of electronic commerce.
In the case of corporate residence, the concept may be reconceptualized on
the basis of the proposals described in chapter 12. Ideally, corporate residence
should be based on substantive economic connections, such as the place of central management and control, the location of assets, and the residence of majority
shareholders. No matter which test is adopted, uncertainty exists. In order to
minimize this uncertainty, the proposed GPS method would allocate business
profits to each country in which economic factors (such as assets, payroll, and
sales) are located. The UWT would also reduce the reliance on corporate residence by taxing portfolio income at source. Under the proposal, corporate
residence remains relevant only in limited circumstances (for example, the
determination of whether a corporation is entitled to treaty benefits and sources
of portfolio income).
The characterization of income remains relevant, but it needs to be rationalized and simplified. Under the proposed system, income would be characterized
as either “business profits” or “portfolio income.” Business profits would include payments of portfolio income between related corporations. Portfolio
income would include dividends, interest, rent, royalties, and capital gains.
Source rules and the notion of permanent establishment should be reconceptualized on the basis of the economic origin of income. The source of portfolio
income, the territorial location of the economic factors under the GPS method,
and the permanent establishment concept are explained in more detail below.
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Reform Proposal: An Overview
The Proposal
The reform proposal has two components. The first component is a UWT applicable to portfolio income. The UWT would be a final tax if the taxpayer is not
subject to residence-based taxation on the same income, and a creditable tax if
the income is also taxable in the residence country. The rate of withholding tax
would be reduced by tax treaties so that source and residence countries can
share the taxation of international portfolio income. The residence country would
have the option to apply anti-avoidance rules to portfolio income channelled
through tax haven intermediaries (such as the foreign investment entities rules in
Canada33 and the passive foreign investment company [PFIC] rules in the United
States34). In that case, source withholding tax should be imputed to the domestic investor in order to prevent overtaxation.
The second component of the proposal is the GPS method applicable to
business profits earned by MNEs. Business profits would be allocated to each
jurisdiction where income-earning activities take place and taxed in the country
to which they are allocated.
The proposed system assumes that countries continue to rely on income
taxation as a useful instrument for raising revenue and redistributing social
income. It also assumes that a country asserts as much sovereignty in tax policy
as possible without endangering its economic relations with other countries.35
Despite the growing difficulty in applying territorial-based tax laws in a “borderless economy,”36 it is unlikely that nation states will surrender tax sovereignty
in return for a global tax system.
While each country wants to retain tax sovereignty, more effective international tax cooperation will be expected and indeed demanded in the new international tax order. Not only should tax rules be redesigned, tax enforcement
powers should be less restricted by national borders. Otherwise, the tax system
will be “gamed”37 by taxpayers as transactions circle the globe in milliseconds
over the Internet, and tax inspectors remain chained to the borders of each
country.38 Interestingly, international cooperation will help nations preserve national control over tax policy and thus strengthen their fiscal sovereignty. As
Benjamin Franklin proclaimed when he signed the US Declaration of Independence: “We must indeed hang together, or most assuredly we will all hang
separately.”39 The wisdom of this proclamation may be driving the OECD-led
harmful tax competition campaign. It is fair to assume, however, that tax havens
will continue to exist and have no interest in cooperating with other countries.
The utility of tax havens as bases for avoiding taxes can be removed only
through effective source withholding and GPS.
Finally, the proposed system has several limitations. It does not deal with the
issue of imputation.40 Nor does it address questions of technical administration.41
It is hoped that the technological changes that facilitate electronic commerce
and create the challenges to the existing taxation framework also provide new
opportunities for improving tax administration.42
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Simpler and Fairer
The proposed system would be simpler than the present system because (1) the
number of income categories would be reduced to two (portfolio income and
business profit), (2) transfer-pricing rules would be replaced by the simpler GPS
method; and (3) the rules with regard to controlled foreign corporations (CFCs),
thin capitalization, and surplus stripping would be unnecessary.
The proposed system would be more equitable in terms of inter-nation
fairness because income would be allocated to, and taxed in, countries that
contribute to the earning of such income. Both source and residence countries
would share the taxation of international income, and the opportunity for tax
avoidance or evasion would be significantly reduced.

Evolutionary and Pragmatic
The proposed system respects the aphorism natura non facit saltum—nature
makes no sudden leaps.43 It is an evolutionary proposal44 and is therefore different
from other proposals that would replace income taxation with a consumption-based
tax such as the “X-tax”;45 replace corporate income taxation with consumptionbased taxation of multinationals46 or some other form of cash flow or consumption
tax;47 or turn over the international tax problem to some higher, and presumably
wiser, supernational authority such as an international tax organization48 (most
recently proposed by authors of a UN report49). On the whole, the revolutionary
approach seems overly ambitious, even utopian, and perhaps unnecessary.50
The proposed UWT and GPS are based on some old ideas of international
taxation. Withholding taxes have always been imposed by countries on investment income earned by non-resident taxpayers primarily because these taxes
are easier to enforce. Formulary apportionment of profits between jurisdictions
was widely used until the arm’s-length principle became the dominant principle
and is used by subnational governments in Canada and the United States. As
explained in more detail later this chapter, in recent years there has been a
growing movement toward the use of formulary allocation.
The proposal is also pragmatic. Pragmatic concerns have shaped the current
international tax system, and they will undoubtedly influence its development in the
future. The history of international income taxation attests to this. As explained
in chapter 2, although the economic allegiance theory provided a foundation for
international tax law, it has not been fully implemented. The League of Nations
model conventions were developed by tax administrators who relied more on
previous bilateral tax treaties (which were, of course, negotiated by tax administrators) than on the economic allegiance theory or the recommendations of the
League of Nations economists.51 When the OECD took over the work on bilateral treaties in 1956, it relied on previous models and the recent treaty practices
of its member countries in order to develop the OECD model.52 A worldwide
reliance on source withholding tax as a means of taxing investment income
earned by non-residents is also explained by the fact that withholding tax is
easier to enforce.
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Uniform Withholding Tax
The proposed UWT is intended to perform two duties: protect the source country’s tax base and curb international tax avoidance through the use of tax haven
intermediaries. Its design draws from the writings by Richard Doernberg,53 AviYonah,54 the eComTaxpert Group of India,55 and some others.56 Salient aspects of
this proposal are discussed below.

Tax Base: Portfolio Income
The proposed UWT would be imposed on portfolio income. Portfolio income
typically includes dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and capital gains earned
by taxpayers from portfolio investment (as opposed to direct foreign investment).
Payments of dividends, interest, rents, or royalties between related corporations
would not be treated as giving rise to portfolio income, but rather as business
profits subject to the GPS method.57
The source of portfolio income could be based on either the base-erosion
test or the residence-of-payer test. The base-erosion test58 sources portfolio
income to the country whose tax base is reduced by the deduction of the payment
of the income. The domestic source rules in Canada and Singapore adopt this
approach in certain cases.59 The OECD model adopts this approach in respect of
interest payments borne by a permanent establishment. In most cases, payers of
portfolio income are entitled to deduct the payment in computing their income
from business or property and, therefore, a payer’s country of residence would
be the source country. However, in cases where a payer is not entitled to deduct
the payment—as in the case of payments made by individual customers, government bodies, or tax-exempt entities—the base-erosion approach fails to assign
the source of portfolio income to the payer’s country of residence.
The residence-of-payer test sources portfolio income to the payer’s country of residence. This is preferable in the context of the proposed UWT, because
it is broader than the base-erosion approach. Most payers are businesses that
deduct the payments, but are also government institutions, non-profit institutions, and individual consumers. The residence-of-payer approach is also the
predominant method under existing treaty law and domestic laws for sourcing
investment income. It generally coincides with the place-of-customer rule as
proposed by Avi-Yonah.60
The compliance concern with imposing the withholding obligation on nonbusiness payers is a legitimate one, but only in respect of individual customers,
because institutional payers generally have a withholding mechanism in place
(if nothing else, payroll withholding). Determining the residence of individuals and
institutions would generally be straightforward. If the residence of business payers is difficult to establish, the base-erosion approach could be used as a backup.

Rate
Because the proposed UWT is designed not only to protect source taxation but
also to prevent the shifting of portfolio income to tax haven intermediaries, the
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tax rate should be set to approximate the level of taxation in the taxpayer’s
country of residence. Because taxes in residence countries are imposed on a net
basis and the proposed UWT is a gross-basis tax, the UWT rate should be much
lower than the standard tax rate in residence countries. This rate would be
reduced by tax treaties so that both residence and source countries can share the
taxation of portfolio income. International overtaxation would be avoided
through foreign tax credit mechanism in the residence country. In cases where
the profit margin is slim and the gross-basis source withholding tax would
result in excessive taxation, tax treaties could allow the taxpayer to elect to pay
source-country tax on a net basis.61

Advantages and Disadvantages
The proposed UWT has at least four advantages over the current system. The
first advantage is that it is theoretically correct. The UWT on portfolio income
can be justified under the benefit theory because the earning of income benefits
from the public services provided by the source country (including a market
base and legal framework). It is also consistent with the economic allegiance
theory because portfolio income could be viewed as originating, at least in part,
in the source country. This argument is strengthened, moreover, by the fact that
payments of interest, rent, and royalties are generally deductible by corporate
payers in computing their profits and thereby reduce the corporate tax base of
the payer’s country.
The second advantage is that the UWT has the potential to curb international tax avoidance and tax evasion. It removes the tax incentives for using tax
haven intermediaries, since capital is actually used in “real countries” and, thus,
the income from capital would be taxed at least once in the source countries. To
earn decent returns without incurring excessive risk, investors must use the
markets in the European Union, the United States, Japan, China, and other countries. Stopping tax avoidance at the source level seems to be the most sensible
and effective method.62 Moreover, the imposition of withholding tax at source
on all forms of portfolio income would reduce opportunities for tax arbitrage by
taxpayers through the use of hybrid or derivative financial instruments. In other
words, if only certain types of portfolio income, such as dividends, are subject
to withholding tax at source, taxpayers can use cross-border securitizations or
derivative financial instruments to circumvent the tax by converting dividends
into capital gains or interest.63
The third advantage is that the UWT promotes inter-nation fairness by
allowing both residence and source countries to share the taxation of portfolio
income. If the country of residence adopts the foreign tax credit mechanism for
double taxation relief, portfolio income would be taxable in that country to the
extent that its tax level exceeds the source withholding tax. If the residence
country adopts the tax-exemption mechanism, the withholding tax would be the
only tax imposed on portfolio income. The bias against source countries under
the current international tax system would be eliminated. More important, the
proposed UWT would help residence countries that have the jurisdiction to tax
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foreign portfolio income but have found it increasingly difficult to exercise this
jurisdiction effectively. Because portfolio income is already taxed at source and
this tax is creditable in the residence country, taxpayers would gain little tax
advantage from non-reporting in the residence country.
The fourth advantage of the UWT lies in its effective enforcement. The
UWT is better than other forms of tax collection because it can be efficiently
administered. This is particularly attractive to developing countries, which often have limited tax administration and collection resources. All countries have
experience with withholding tax. It is the only viable method of tax collection
in cases where the taxpayer is physically out of the source country and has no
assets located in the source country.
The UWT may, however, be challenged by arguments against traditional
source withholding taxes imposed by individual countries. The first argument is
that the UWT could result in excessive taxation. Excessive taxation occurs
when a gross-basis withholding tax in the source country exceeds a net-basis
tax in the residence country. This is true when profit margins are very small—for
example, where interest is earned by financial institutions or portfolio income is
earned by investors who finance the investment with borrowed money. This
disadvantage could be addressed through treaty reduction of withholding tax
rate and a net-basis election.
It has also been argued that source withholding taxes are economically
inefficient on the grounds that they are “tariffs on cross-border investment” and
interfere with marketplace efficiency by “raising the cost of imported capital in
the country above the world market cost of such capital.”64 This argument
assumes that the incidence of withholding tax is borne by the payer rather than
the recipient. However, this assumption is not true where the pre-tax rates of
return are invariant with respect to withholding tax rates and investors/lenders
expect to obtain full offsetting tax credits in the residence country. In this case,
the incidence of withholding taxes falls entirely on the treasury in the residence
country. The economic inefficiency criticism is valid, however, in the extreme
case where pre-tax rates of return are grossed up one for one with the withholding tax and the incidence of the withholding tax is borne entirely by the payer
of portfolio income.65 Moreover, “no one claims that taxation in any form,
source or residence, is a boon to economic activity.”66 Source withholding tax
on a gross basis is especially cumbersome and it is understandable why financial
market participants often inveigh against such tax. However, this problem can
be solved either by abolishing withholding taxes67 or by imposing the proposed
UWT at a reasonable rate. Assuming that the marketplace takes the tax into
account, the advantages of the UWT vastly outweigh any irritants to cross-border
capital movement.
Capital flight and tax competition concerns have also been raised as reasons for imposing no source withholding taxes on portfolio income. Indeed,
Avi-Yonah found that “the principal reason for the lack of withholding taxes in
most of the countries [including the United States] is the fear that if such taxes
were imposed, capital would swiftly move to other locations that do not impose
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a withholding tax.”68 In the meantime, however, if source withholding taxes are
adopted multilaterally and fully implemented by all countries (that is, if the
proposed UWT is adopted), a source-based system with equal effective rates in
all countries would, by definition, prevent tax competition and capital flight.69
The “if” in the last sentence is a big one. Many transitional issues need to be
resolved first.

Transitional Issues
There are three types of transitional issues that must be addressed before the
UWT can be implemented: technical difficulties, a race to the bottom in tax
policy, and political obstacles.
Technically, the proposed UWT would require modifications both to tax
treaties and to domestic law. Conceptually, these modifications would be relatively easy. For example, the existing provisions in the OECD model concerning
dividends, interest, and royalties could be consolidated into a single provision
for portfolio income subject to source withholding tax. Practically speaking, however, amending each of some 2,000 bilateral tax treaties would be extremely
difficult and time-consuming. To simplify the matter, the OECD could persuade
its member countries to uniformly implement the measures and revise their treaties accordingly. Since the lion’s share of the world’s portfolio income is derived
from OECD countries by residents of OECD countries, uniform adoption by
these countries would be a marked improvement over the current situation.
A race-to-the-bottom type of tax competition among source countries will
continue to be a big concern. Although OECD countries have acted in concert
against “harmful” tax competition practices of non-OECD countries (mostly tax
havens), OECD countries themselves are engaged in a race to the bottom in
respect of exempting portfolio interest and royalties from source taxation. Such
a race also occurs among non-OECD countries. If the United States were unwilling to abolish the exemption, others would certainly not change their policy
for fear of capital flight. For this reason, uniform adoption of the proposed
system would be unlikely in the absence of US support. Given that OECD
countries are the world’s biggest source countries and the proposed UWT would
benefit these countries the most, they may be persuaded to raise their withholding taxes on all forms of portfolio income to a standard rate of say, 25 percent
(like Canada) and apply reduced rates where there is a treaty. Non-OECD countries may realize that imposing the withholding tax would not result in capital
flight and may agree to follow suit. That should benefit net capital-importing
countries, most of which are poorer countries that are afraid of raising their
taxes in case they lose out in the competition for investment.
Traditional tax havens do not matter, because they do not have treaties and
portfolio income paid into holding companies located in these havens would be
subject to the proposed UWT at the standard rate. Treaty havens, such as Barbados, are problematic. These countries have treaties and offer “preferential tax
regimes” (using OECD’s term)70 and are used in treaty-shopping schemes. What
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the world community could do is tell treaty havens either to remove their offshore
regime or to agree to revise their treaties so that reduced treaty rates do not
apply. Otherwise, OECD countries would terminate the treaties.
Finally, the non-taxation of portfolio income has been politically popular
with three powerful allies: business enterprises seeking cheaper capital, the
financial institutions that run the withholding system, and the increasingly large
group of tax minimizers (evaders or avoiders) who supply much of the money.71
Bird wrote in 1988:
Change will not come easily, or soon, in the face of such opposition. But it
must, in the end, occur—perhaps through a reassertion of the source principle—if anything like the present income tax is to continue to exist in this
increasingly integrated world.72

Global Profit Split: Major Design Issues
The proposed GPS method would allocate an MNE’s global business profits to
members of the MNE group by applying predetermined criteria.73 The method is
based on the existing profit-split methods and some elements of the traditional
formulary apportionment method used by a number of US states74 and Canadian
provinces.75 Major design issues in respect of the GPS are discussed in this
section and tax policy and transitional issues are discussed in the two subsequent sections.

Basic Features
The proposed GPS method would treat an economically integrated business as a
single entity for tax purposes. In this sense, it is similar to the “unitary system”
used in California and some other US states. The GPS method would differ from
the unitary system in the design of factors used to determine the profit split.
Another difference relates to semantics. The unitary system, largely for political
reasons, has a bad international reputation.76 It does not illustrate the inadequacy
of the worldwide allocation approach, but rather the non-viability of any approach that increases taxes on internationally mobile capital and is applied in
only a few jurisdictions.77 However, because the “word [unitary] alone makes
other countries apoplectic,”78 its use is deliberately avoided in this proposal.
The proposed GPS method differs from the existing profit-split methods in
five ways:
1) The GPS method would use an explicit fractional apportionment method,
rather than a case-by-case functional analysis approach. Although arbitrary, the GPS would be more certain. The factors chosen would represent
the economic factors that contribute to the production of profit.
2) The GPS method would not be a transaction-based method, as that term
is used in the OECD transfer-pricing guidelines, and thus it would avoid
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the problems associated with the transactional approach. It would be
necessary to define “integrated business,” but arriving at a definition
would likely be no more difficult than finding the often non-existent
“comparable transactions.”
3) The GPS method would directly allocate a firm’s total profit, as opposed
to the current use of the profit split to establish arm’s-length prices,
which are in turn used to determine profit. The GPS would thus reflect
the purpose of article 9(1) of the OECD model in allocating profit among
countries.
4) The GPS method would not require that an integrated business of an
MNE group be compared with the business of independent firms. Consequently, it would reflect the unique nature of intrafirm transactions
and would eliminate the practical difficulties of finding comparables.
Profit would be allocated on the basis of contributions made internally
by each participant in the business. The base of the allocation would be
the total profit from the globally integrated business.
5) Given that all participants would be treated the same, the GPS method
would apply equally to branches and subsidiaries.
Because of the expected opposition to the proposed GPS method on technical grounds—the devil is in the details—it is to these details that we now turn.
The following discussion draws from the existing literature, especially writings
by Bird,79 Jerome Hellerstein,80 Walter Hellerstein,81 Langbein,82 McDaniel,83
McIntyre,84 McLure,85 Pomp,86 and Weiner.87

Scope of Application
“Integrated Business”
The definition of “integrated business” is critical to the proposed GPS method
because it draws a circle around the total profit to be split. Bearing in mind that
the main objective of the GPS is to ensure a fair allocation of the global profit
from an MNE’s integrated business, the definition of “business” and “integrated
business” should capture the economic value of integration and allocate it according to the formula. As in the case of “global dealing operations” in the proposed
US regulations, what matters is an entity’s participation in the integrated business, not the legal form of the entity.
The term “business” may be defined on the basis of standard industrial
classification categories or by reference to recognized lines of business. In
defining the term “integrated business,” some useful lessons may be learned
from the tests used for defining “unitary business” for the purposes of US state
corporate income taxation.88 These tests include the control test, the flow-ofvalue test, and the operational-interdependence test.
The control test could be based on legal ownership of equity or on de facto
control of the business operations of a controlled entity. A bright-line legal
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ownership test is perhaps easier to administer.89 The control test may be used as
the sole test because once an entity is considered to be under common control,
all of its active income is deemed to be income from an integrated business.
This test is arguably justified on the ground that unless an entity benefits from
the economies of scale or contributes to the synergy of the whole MNE, it will
likely be spun off and replaced by an outside supplier. Alternatively, the control
test could be used in combination with the flow-of-value test or the operationalinterdependence test.
Under the flow-of-value test, a business is integrated if there is a flow of value
among the units under common control.90 Under the operational-interdependence
test, “a business is not unitary unless interdependent basic operations are carried on to a substantial extent in different states by the branches or subsidiaries
that constitute the controlled enterprise.”91 “Interdependence” is determined by
the flow of tangible goods, services, and, in some cases, intangibles. This test
reflects the interdependence of the basic operations of units of an MNE. For
administrative ease in implementing this test, a threshold could be required—
say, one-third or one-half of the value of the flow of goods, services, or intangibles among units.92
Both the flow-of-value test and the operational-interdependence test seem
to involve a high degree of factual determination. MNEs are typically engaged
in a variety of activities, some of which are part of an integrated business and
some of which are not. Caution needs to be exercised in defining which activities are parts of an integrated business. Guidance may be drawn from countries’
experience in defining qualifying “cost-contribution arrangements,” “global trading,” or even the businesses covered by advance pricing agreements (APAs).
“Global Profit”
The definition of “global profit” determines the size of the pie to be divided
among the participants in an integrated business, and hence the countries involved. Currently, there is no international agreement on the computation of
profit. In general, however, global profit from each integrated business would be
the excess of revenues over expenses allocable to the business. The measurement
of the global tax base is not a problem unique to global formulary apportionment. Miller notes that it also exists under a residency system—in particular, in
the implementation of the tax credit regime.93
Global profit could be defined on the basis of financial accounting. MNEs
that have their shares listed in multiple jurisdictions must now comply with
financial reporting requirements in the listing jurisdictions. Current practices
may provide guidance for the definition of global profit for GPS purposes. The
definition might also be developed from certain principles that are commonly
applied in the taxation of business income.94 For example, revenues from the sale
of goods and services are generally recognized on an accrual basis, and business
expenditures, such as labour compensation, depreciation, interest, and purchased
goods and services, are generally deductible in computing taxable income.
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In computing the amount of revenues for the purposes of the global profit
definition, only receipts from independent third parties in respect of sales of
goods or services, or royalties from licences, should be included; intrafirm transactions should be ignored. With respect to expenditures, it would be necessary
to decide whether all operating expenses incurred by all participants in carrying
on the integrated business should be aggregated and deducted, or whether instead
certain expenses should be dealt with separately. If all expenses are aggregated,
global expenses would be divided under the profit-split formula. Although this
approach is simple to administer, it may force one country to allow deductions
for local day-to-day operating expenses incurred by a related party in another
country, and some tax authorities may find this practice unacceptable.95 Alternatively, “local expenses” might be excluded from the aggregate calculation
and deducted by the relevant entity once a global profit has been allocated to
each location. Local expenses could be defined as those expenses that are
incurred locally and are not fungible. One example of a local expense is rent for
office space.
Interest expenses are difficult to deal with because the existing rules on
interest deduction vary from country to country, and the treatment for a branch
may differ from that for a subsidiary. To allow for such differential treatment,
interest expenses would be excluded from the computation of global profit and
from the subsequent allocation among participating entities.96 The disadvantage
of this approach is that it would encourage MNEs to book interest in high-tax
countries.
Finally, global profit would include not only business income derived from
the integrated business, but also investment income attributable to the activities
of that integrated business. Article 7 of the OECD model allows investment income
to be taxed as business profits if it is attributable to a permanent establishment.

Formulary Allocation of Profit
Once global profit from a globally integrated business has been determined, the
next step is to allocate the profit to each participant in the business by using an
allocation formula. Factors in the formula may include payroll, sales, tangible
assets, and intangibles. These factors have been used, to varying degrees, in
traditional formulary allocation methods (discussed below). In addition, they
are implicitly recognized in articles 5 and 7 of the OECD model. In article 5, the
notion of permanent establishment is essentially defined as a place of business
consisting of human capital and capital assets.97 In article 7, the attribution of
profit is based on the revenue (from sales of goods or services) and expenses
arising from the business activities of the permanent establishment. The factors
of human capital (indicated by payroll), assets (tangible and intangible), and
revenue from sales thus underlie the current regime of taxing business profits
earned through a permanent establishment.
Each participant in an integrated business would be allocated an appropriate
percentage of the global profit. The appropriate percentage would be calculated
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as the aggregate of payroll, sales, tangible property, and intangibles in the
participant’s taxing jurisdiction divided by the worldwide payroll, sales, tangible property, and intangibles.98
These factors could be equally weighted, or perhaps more weight could be
given to some factors than to others. For example, it may be considered that
sales deserve more weight. Currently, some US states that apply formulary
apportionment use sales as a single factor in the formula.99 Economically
speaking, “sales, if anything, are the more or most important factor in indicating the ‘relative contribution’ of a component to an enterprise’s group profit.”100
A modified formula may apply to specified industries, such as financial services and transportation, among others.

The Factors
The design of the formula raises serious technical challenges. Each factor needs
to be defined and sourced to a particular jurisdiction. Ideally, each factor should
be readily quantifiable and locatable, economically justifiable as a determinant
of tax liability, and not subject to artificial manipulation.101

Payroll
The payroll factor would reflect the cost of labour compensation. The formula
could use total cost of labour compensation irrespective of legal form (for example, employer-provided insurance, pensions, and other social benefits, as well
as contract employment).
The physical location of this factor could be the place where a worker
works or has his or her base of operations. If a worker has no particular base of
operations, the worker’s country of residence could be used as the location of
the payroll factor. If a worker has a base of operations in more than one country,
payroll expense would be allocated to each country on the basis of the time
spent in each country. For the purposes of the formula, the location of the employer is irrelevant because all workers work for the integrated business.102

Sales
The sales factor would reflect the sales of products or services to parties that
are not participants in the integrated business. It would also include transfers of
property or services from an integrated business to non-integrated units of the
same MNE. Such transfers would be treated as deemed sales at fair market value.
In the case of intangibles (discussed further below), valuation may be very
difficult. A “profit-sharing” or “superroyalty” type of rule may be necessary to
ensure that research and development businesses fully participate in sharing the
economic benefits resulting from the research and development.
The location of sales may be:
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• for sales of goods, the place of “origin” (the seller) or the place of
“destination” (the customer);
• for services, the place of the customer or the place where services are
rendered; and
• for intangibles, the place of origin or the place of the payer.
In light of the threat to source taxation and contributions made by market
jurisdictions to the earning of global profit, the use of place of origin as a sole test
is not recommended. The place of destination may be used either as a sole test or
in combination with the place-of-origin test. In the latter case, sales would be
apportioned between the place of the customer and the place of the seller or
provider.

Tangible Property
Tangible property is probably the most reliable factor in the GPS formula. It is
reasonably easy to quantify and to locate geographically. The jurisdiction where
tangible assets are located generally provides legal protection and infrastructure
and is thus entitled to tax a portion of the income derived through the use of
these assets. In determining the cost of the tangible assets of each component, in
addition to the actual cost, each component may be allowed a “location savings”
for the net production cost savings realized from operating in its jurisdiction.103

Intangibles
Intangible assets are often difficult to quantify, much less value, and they are
also very slippery to locate.104 At the same time, much of the residual profit of
integrated businesses may be derived from intangibles. They are the “crown
jewels” of MNEs. Therefore, the treatment of intangibles is crucial to the design
of the proposed GPS method. Intangibles are not identified as a separate factor
under traditional formulary apportionment.
The definition of “intangibles” for the purposes of the proposed GPS method
could be based on the existing definition in chapter VI of the OECD transferpricing guidelines.105 Thus, the term would include commercial intangibles, such
as patents and copyrights, and marketing intangibles, such as trademarks and
trade names.
Both commercial intangibles and marketing intangibles may be measured
by cost.106 For commercial intangibles, cost would include expenditures on
research and development and the cost of obtaining legal protection of the
intangibles. For marketing intangibles, it would include the cost of advertising
and marketing. However, using cost as a measurement of intangibles may be
problematic for two reasons. First, there is no necessary link between cost and
value.107 Second, historic costs may be difficult to determine since valuable
intangibles (especially marketing intangibles) may be created over a period of
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years.108 While the value of intangibles may alternatively be based on fair
market value, this is difficult to establish on an annual basis.
The cost method has the virtue of being simple to apply. To some extent,
the fair market value of intangibles is expected to be reflected in the sales
factor. Proprietary technology used for the production of a product or the creation of a valuable trademark will be reflected in market prices fetched by the
product made with such technology or bearing the trademark. Thus, it is arguable
that using both the sales factor and the cost-of-intangibles factor in the formula
would account for the lion’s share of the contribution of intangibles to the
profitability of the integrated business. It would also attribute this profitability
to both the “production” jurisdiction (where cost is incurred) and the “destination” jurisdiction (where products or services are sold).
With respect to the location of intangibles, commercial intangibles could
be sited to the country where research and development occurred, and marketing intangibles could be sited to the country where products or services are
marketed. In many cases, the site will be the country where the cost is incurred
and recognized for tax purposes. Therefore, the country where research or marketing is performed would receive some taxing capacity because that jurisdiction
supported the people and property that produced the resulting intangible assets.
Also, for the same reason, countries that grant intellectual property protection
to those assets should receive taxing capacity.
In some cases, it would be very difficult to locate research and development cost when it is embodied in human capital or mobile assets. Consider, for
example, the following case.109 X Corp does research in the United States, where
a Hungarian immigrant has a bright idea, and China, where Chinese scientists
turn this idea into something potentially useful. Development is done in India,
where computer whizzes and “cheap” engineers manage to develop a marketable product. The design is then sent to a Thai factory for further development
by process engineers (who come from several different countries), and the final
product is “developed” by Thai workers and managers. Finally, the product is
manufactured in Nicaraguan and Moroccan factories for eventual sales in NAFTA
and EU countries. What portion of the research and development cost should be
allocated to each jurisdiction?
Similar difficulties exist with respect to locating the cost of marketing
intangibles. Charles McLure explains the problem as follows:
Consider, for example, the value of intangibles such as the trademarks for a
soft drink or the endorsement of sporting equipment by an American sports
star. Should these intangible assets be attributed to (for purposes of calculating the property factor), primarily, the country in which the trademark was
originally developed or in which the athlete performed, and not to the place
where products are sold? Does it matter how much advertising is conducted
in the market country? Does it matter that the product enjoys a monopoly
position in the local market, perhaps because of government policy? In other
words, is there a difference between intangibles based on R & D and those
based simply on reputation and advertising (or on monopoly power)?110
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Because of these difficulties, some proponents of formulary apportionment,
such as McLure, conclude that since it is impossible to determine the situs of
intangibles, perhaps intangibles should be ignored as a factor.111 Otherwise, “if
one wants to determine the location, as well as the value of intangible assets, one
is likely to be forced into analysis similar to that under the separate accounting
standard.”112 Hellerstein also has argued against including intangibles in the
formula, for two reasons: first, because intangibles are nebulous, with respect to
location, benefits and protections furnished by the state, and social costs incurred; and second, because their inclusion could prove highly distorting.113
If intangibles were not a separate factor in the formula, the value of intangibles would be allocated on the basis of payroll, sales, and tangible property.
This approach is still an improvement over the current system, because the
residual profit would not be assigned to the “owner” of intangibles alone, but
also to jurisdictions where payroll cost is incurred, sales are made, and tangible
property is located. Often, commercial intangibles have only a notional existence, as ideas in people’s heads, or they are inherent in the capabilities of
machines.114 To some extent, the cost of research and development would be
reflected in the salaries paid to engineers, scientists, managers, and workers
who participated in the research and development, as well as in expenditures on
equipment purchased to carry out the research and development or the value of
products produced with the intangibles. In the case of marketing intangibles,
the cost would be reflected through increased sales.
Obviously, the treatment of intangibles is worthy of more study. At
present, this author leans toward the inclusion of intangibles as a factor in the
formula for the main reason that it would give technology-exporting countries
specific recognition. As discussed in a later section, the current use of costsharing arrangements by some MNEs may offer practical assistance in tracing
and valuing the cost of intangibles. Intangibles would be valued on the basis of
cost and sited to the location where research and development activities occur.
The market value of intangibles would be included in the sales factor. Possibly,
the mobility issue mentioned earlier could be partially addressed by the payroll
and tangible property factors.
“Throwout” Factors
In cases where factors are located in countries that have no jurisdiction to tax
the global profit of an integrated business, or in countries that do not impose
any income tax (such as traditional tax havens), these factors could be thrown
out (omitted) from the formula.115 The profit that would otherwise be attributable to these jurisdictions would be captured by the formula and allocated to
other participants.

Jurisdiction To Tax Global Profit
The proposed GPS method aims to allocate income from an integrated business
between taxing jurisdictions that have a connection with the earning of the
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income. In other words, income is earned in a jurisdiction because some or all
of the factors are located in that jurisdiction. In a treaty context, the threshold of
a permanent establishment can be retained. However, in order to enable market
countries to tax profits from the electronic sale of goods or services to domestic
customers, the concept of permanent establishment would be redefined to include
not only a “physical presence,” but also an “economic presence” based on the
level of sales (for example, $1 million or some other amount agreed to by treaty
partners). A computer server should not be considered to constitute a permanent
establishment because servers are mobile and multiple servers can be used.
The GPS method described above draws ideas from existing profit-split and
traditional formulary apportionment methods. It is aimed at achieving “rough
approximation, not precision.”116 It is recognized that further study is required
to make the GPS method workable in the real world. Nevertheless, the GPS is
superior to the existing system in the ways described below, under the heading
“Global Profit Split: Advantages and Disadvantages.” Even more important, it
can be implemented because it is part of an evolutionary process started before
the rise of electronic commerce.117

Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach
This section of the chapter argues that the proposed GPS method can be implemented on the basis that the law of evolution is on its side. The GPS represents
incremental changes to the existing system and is not “radical” or “revolutionary.”118 The discussion that follows shows that the proposed method evolves
from the historical development of the arm’s-length principle and from current
applications of formulary allocation in various circumstances. As will be explained, these and other factors support the possibility that an international
consensus can be developed on implementation of the GPS.119

Historical Development of the Arm’s-Length Principle
Article 9 of the OECD model codifies the arm’s-length principle. As argued in
chapter 12, under the heading “Questionable Interpretation of Article 9(1) of the
OECD Model,” article 9(1) does not strictly require the comparable transactional
pricing approach. This interpretation is borne out by the historical development of
the arm’s-length principle and by the gradual movement toward formulary allocation.120 In order to cope with the reality of integrated businesses, as discussed
below, the separate-accounting approach is giving way to the apportionment of
profit on a more formulary basis.
The Early Years
At the beginning of the 20th century, few countries had introduced rules for the
allocation of cross-border corporate income.121 In the 1920s, the League of Nations appointed expert groups to study the problem of double taxation and the
allocation of income. In 1927, a committee of technical experts drafted a convention for the prevention of double taxation,122 which was intended as a model
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bilateral treaty. Article 5 of the 1927 model convention provided principles for
allocating income of a corporation among permanent establishments in different countries but did not recommend a specific allocation method. In 1928, the
United States enacted the predecessor of current section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code.123 The original section provided no particular method for determining the permitted allocation of income.
In 1933, the League of Nations commissioned a study to survey the methods of allocation of income used in various countries. The report was begun by
Thomas S. Adams of Yale University and completed in 1933 by his assistant,
Mitchell Carroll, after Adams’s death. Carroll visited 27 countries and made an
extended study of their tax systems.124
The Carroll report stated that there was little legislation or jurisprudence
concerning the allocation of income and that it was thus necessary to study the
practices followed by the various administrations. He found that both separate
accounting and formulary apportionment were practised in various countries,
but recommended separate accounting exclusively. Carroll contended that “the
conduct of business between a corporation and its subsidiaries on the basis of
dealings with an independent enterprise obviates all problems of allocation.”125
Carroll’s recommendation was adopted in the 1933 draft convention,126 which
called for adjustments of accounts of associated enterprises to reflect arm’slength prices.127 The 1933 draft convention clarified that the use of formulary
apportionment as a fallback method was permissible with respect to allocations
to permanent establishments, but did not mention whether it was permissible
with respect to allocations to associated enterprises. This is also the origin of
article 9 of the current OECD model.128
The United States first adopted the arm’s-length standard in 1935 by introducing regulations under the predecessor of Code section 482. The standard
was very simple: in determining the “true net income of each controlled taxpayer . . . [t]he standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled
taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.”129
The Formative Years
From 1935 to the mid-1960s, the number of multinational corporations was
small. Consequently, the arm’s-length principle had little international impact.
It was not until 1968 that specific transfer-pricing methods were introduced.130
In 1968, the US Treasury began refining and elaborating on the section 482
regulations, a process that has continued to the present day. The 1968 regulations
attempted, for the first time, to establish rules for applying the arm’s-length
standard to specific types of transactions, but with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the unique character of multinational business. The determination
of a fair arm’s-length price for intercompany sales of tangible property was a
central issue. The regulations recognized three methods that could be used in
valuing the property, as well as an unspecified default method. The preferred
choice was the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method. Because this
method required the availability of comparable transactions, where these could
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not be found, prices were determined by applying either the resale-price
method or the cost-plus method. Where none of these methods could reasonably be applied under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, some
other appropriate method was to be used.131 No specific method was identified
for the pricing of services.132 In respect of intangibles, the regulations anticipated the lack of comparables; instead of setting forth any specific method,
they listed 12 factors to be taken into account, without establishing any priority
or relative weight among them.133 Overall, the legislative guidance on transfer
pricing under the 1968 regulations focused on a transactional approach that
relied heavily on comparability with dealings—whether actual or hypothesized—between independent parties.
The OECD commenced a study of transfer pricing in 1976, which culminated
in the 1979 report of the Fiscal Committee, proposing detailed transfer-pricing
guidelines for adoption by OECD member governments.134 Drawing heavily on
the US regulations, the OECD report reflected a broadly similar approach to the
use of transfer-pricing methods. Like the United States, the OECD favoured the CUP
method as best reflecting the arm’s-length principle. The OECD also agreed with
the use of the resale-price and cost-plus methods where comparables were not
available. Overall, the OECD 1979 report was substantially the same as the US
regulations.
As multinational businesses evolved, it became apparent that the transferpricing methods set out in the 1968 US regulations and the 1979 OECD report
were inadequate to deal with many types of intrafirm transactions. Specifically,
comparables were either difficult to find or non-existent for transactions that
involved intangible property and/or services. Although national tax authorities
and the OECD have been generally steadfast in their commitment to the arm’slength principle, major modifications have been made to the manner in which
the principle is applied. Again, the United States has taken the lead in reformulating the rules.
Recent Modifications
The main trend of the modifications was the gradual weakening of the traditional arm’s-length methods. The trend began with the 1986 amendment to
Code section 482. The revised section 482 requires that the income recognized
by a transferor of an intangible be “commensurate with the income attributable
to the intangible.”135 In passing this amendment, the US Congress noted136 that
the legislation still left many important and difficult transfer-pricing issues
unresolved. It instructed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to undertake a comprehensive study of the issues and to consider carefully whether the regulations
should be modified. The IRS responded by issuing a white paper in 1988,137
proposed regulations in 1992, temporary regulations in 1993, and final regulations in 1994.138
The 1992 proposed regulations recognized transfer-pricing methods (comparable profits method [CPM] and profit-split method) that were radically different
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from those in the earlier regulations and the 1979 OECD report. Under the traditional transactional approach, transfer prices were set solely on the basis of the
facts and circumstances relating to individual transactions, without regard for
the profit position of the parties. The proposed CPM and profit-split method
established prices by working backward from the relative profits that taxpayers
earned from intercompany transactions. These proposed methods relied much
less heavily on comparables and focused more on achieving arm’s-length results
by adopting profit-split methodology applied where functions were highly interrelated and could not be readily evaluated on a separate or an independent basis.
The OECD and foreign governments vigorously opposed the American proposals, initially on the ground that they were inconsistent with the arm’s-length
principle. The OECD went so far as to issue two reports that strongly criticized
various aspects of these proposals.139 The OECD particularly commented on issues arising from the dominant role given to the CPM as a basis for determining
transfer prices.140
Both the OECD and the US government were, however, well aware of the
vital importance of being more or less in step. The subsequent release of the US
final regulations (1994)141 and the OECD transfer-pricing guidelines (1995),142
and their similar approaches to transfer-pricing methodologies, suggest that the
OECD and the United States agreed to a compromise position. The United States
reduced its emphasis on the use of profit-based methodologies and agreed that
traditional transaction-based methods would continue to be important techniques for setting transfer prices. While still according the traditional methods
priority, the OECD agreed that profit-based approaches could be useful in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the OECD, with the apparent support of the
United States, firmly rejected formulary apportionment as a valid method of
determining income in an international setting.
Nevertheless, there are signs that national tax authorities are no longer convinced that article 9 of the OECD model requires exclusive use of the comparable
transactional pricing approach. As discussed below, while national governments
recite their conceptual opposition to formulary apportionment, they allow its
use in practice. Moreover, a joint communiqué issued in 1992 by the IRS and
the tax authorities of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom endorsed the
arm’s-length principle in general but also conceded the applicability of formulary apportionment in appropriate cases.143

Current Uses of Formulary Allocation
As mentioned earlier, there has been a steady drift toward formulary allocation.144
Current uses of formulary allocation methods are discussed below.
APAs
APAs are considered to be the “most successful approach to the transfer pricing
problem.”145 Some APAs are based on formulary apportionment. An example is
the use of global apportionment in the context of APAs involving global trading
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of commodities and financial products.146 In other contexts, the profit-split
method used in APAs relies on allocation factors such as expenses and fixed
assets to determine how the profits should be split, and thus would be an
application of formulary apportionment.147
According to the annual APA report (2000) released by the US Treasury
department,148 a wide range of pricing methods were used in the APAs executed
in 2000 in the United States. The CPM was used in virtually all of them, either
as the primary method or as a means of testing the results obtained under other
methods.149 The profit-level indicators used, in accordance with the CPM, included the following: return on assets or capital employed, operating margin,
gross margin, the Berry ratio (the ratio of gross profit to operating expenses),
markup on total costs, and net margin. These indicators can be interpreted as
single-factor formulas.
An interesting aspect of the US APA program is that foreign-owned US
subsidiaries accounted for the large majority (74.6 percent) of the APAs approved in 2000. There are good practical reasons for this: for the past several
years, the IRS has specifically targeted such entities under its audit program.
These companies use APAs as a way of avoiding contentious audits or, perhaps
more important, of settling these audits in a forward-looking manner to cover
open tax years. Most of the foreign parents of these US subsidiaries are located
in US treaty countries. Presumably, these companies did not invoke article 9 of
the applicable treaty to contest the use of CPM, possibly for reasons of expediency or, more significantly, because of implicit acceptance of the compatibility
of CPM and the arm’s-length approach.
Profit Split in Global Trading
Profit split is the preferred method for allocating profit from global trading
operations under both the OECD draft global trading report150 and the US proposed regulations.151 It is possible to use a three-factor approach to the splitting
of profit—trader compensation, back-office compensation, and risk.152 It is also
possible to use trader compensation as the sole factor.153 The use of a singlefactor formula in allocating combined income may lack economic validity in
most cases; but since many taxpayers are more concerned with a predictable
outcome than with economic purity, a single-factor approach may well suit
their purposes.154
Cost-Contribution Arrangements
Formulary allocation is often used in cost-contribution arrangements (the term
used in the OECD transfer-pricing guidelines and by many OECD member countries) or cost-sharing arrangements (the term used in the United States) in respect
of research and development and other activities.155 A qualified cost-contribution
arrangement is not subject to transfer-pricing adjustment.
The arm’s-length principle requires that each participant’s contribution be
consistent with that which an arm’s-length party would have agreed to contribute
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under comparable circumstances, given the benefit it would have reasonably
expected to derive from the arrangement. Various approaches may be used to
estimate the benefits expected to be obtained by each participant. They include:
• estimation on the basis of anticipated additional income that will be generated or costs that will be saved as a result of entering into the arrangement;
and
• the use of an appropriate allocation key, on the basis of sales; units used,
produced, or sold; gross or operating profits; numbers of employees; capital invested; or alternative factors.156
In essence, this is a formulary allocation approach.
Thin Capitalization
Canada, Japan, the United States, and many other countries have enacted thin
capitalization rules that deny the deduction of interest on “excessive” debt.157
Some countries use a fixed debt-to-equity ratio in determining the amount of
excessive debt (hence excessive interest).158 Article 9 of the OECD model arguably does not apply to thin capitalization situations but applies only to the rate
of related-party loans.159 However, the OECD’s position is that thin capitalization rules are consistent with the arm’s-length principle “insofar as their effect
is to assimilate the profits of the borrower to an amount corresponding to the
profits which would have accrued in an arm’s length situation.”160
It is naïve to argue that the fixed ratio always represents the arm’s-length
ratio of debt to equity from industry to industry. However, there have been no
cases in Canada in which a taxpayer has challenged the validity of the thin
capitalization rules on this basis.161 The use of a fixed ratio has been accepted in
practice.
Attributing Profit to a Permanent Establishment
Formulary allocation has been applied in attributing profit to a permanent establishment under both treaties and domestic law. Under treaty law, article 7(4)
of the OECD model specifically permits countries to attribute profit to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the
enterprise to its various parts if apportionment is customary.162 The OECD commentary on article 7(4) lists three factors that may be used in determining the
allocation:163
1) Turnover or receipts. This factor can be used by enterprises that provide services or produce proprietary articles. For example, an insurance
enterprise may make an apportionment of total profits by reference to
premiums received from policyholders in each of the countries concerned.
2) Expenses. This factor can be used by enterprises that manufacture
goods with a high raw material cost or high labour content.
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3) Capital structure. This factor can be used by banking and other financial enterprises.
Thus, according to the OECD commentary, the use of formulary apportionment in the context of a branch is not always inconsistent with the arm’s-length
principle.164 The recent OECD discussion draft on the attribution of profit to
permanent establishments suggests, however, that article 7(4) is fundamentally
inconsistent with the arm’s-length principle and should be disregarded for the
purposes of the proposed working hypothesis.165 This is an astonishing suggestion, because it questions the integrity of the OECD model in upholding the
arm’s-length principle.166 Meanwhile, the proposed working hypothesis in the
discussion draft has itself been criticized as a departure from the arm’s-length
principle.167
In addition, as Scott Wilkie argues, when the definition of “permanent
establishment” under article 5 and the profit attribution rules under article 7 are
examined together, it is apparent that “the OECD model convention has always
reflected a formulaic aspect that effectively frames an allocative approach to
measuring and attributing enterprise income.”168 He notes that “a typical tax
treaty may be analyzed to reflect a kind of simple three-factor formula—
namely, plant and equipment, salaries and wages (or people), and revenue,
which establish the principal touchstones of income measurement in relation to
a jurisdiction.”169 This view is historically correct, since formulary apportionment
was used concurrently with the separate-accounting approach in attributing
profits to permanent establishments, and has been suggested as a backup
method in earlier model tax conventions.170
As discussed in chapters 4 and 9,171 the Canadian and US domestic laws
allow the use of formulas in allocating interest deductions to branches of foreign banks. US taxpayers have challenged this domestic law as being contrary
to the arm’s-length principle and have won in court.172 For example, in Natl.
Westminster Bank v. US,173 the US Court of Federal Claims held that US regulations requiring the allocation of interest based on a formula are inconsistent
with the “separate enterprise” requirements of article 7 of the US-UK treaty
because the regulations rely on a formula and are not based on a deemed arm’slength relationship between the US branch and the UK head office.174 The US-UK
treaty was subsequently amended to adopt the approach recommended by the
OECD discussion draft.175
Chinese domestic tax laws permit the use of deeming methods in computing
profit attributable to Chinese establishments of foreign enterprises.176 These methods may be based on cost, gross sales, or commissions. China also permits the
use of formulary allocation in computing the profit of foreign branches in China.
Formulary Allocation of Global Profit
As discussed above, the taxable profit of a permanent establishment is determined, at least in some cases, by apportioning the total profits of the enterprise
on the basis of such factors as turnover and cost. In the extreme situation where
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an enterprise carries on business activities outside its home jurisdiction solely
in the form of branches, the formulary allocation method would be applied to
its global income. This is particularly true if a corporation carries on business
activities in the form of a branch in a foreign jurisdiction where formulary allocation is customarily used. In addition, formulary apportionment is already being
practised with respect to the taxation of internal trading in financial flows—the
most mobile of all factors—within multinational banks that span the whole
world and all time zones.177
Formulary Determination of “Cost”
Defining cost base for the purposes of the cost-plus method is crucial. Cost is
identified directly if a direct charge exists, or indirectly by using an appropriate
allocation formula.178 The OECD guidelines identify several factors on which
cost allocation may be based, including turnover, staff employed, capital applied,
time spent to perform a task, and income-producing unit.179 Some national tax
authorities allow the use of a global formula to apportion costs on the basis of
gross turnover of the worldwide group.180
Other Uses Under Domestic Law
Formulary allocation is currently used at different stages in determining a taxpayer’s income tax liability under domestic laws. First of all, formulary allocation
is used to define the source of income. For Canadian income tax purposes, for
example, income from employment services rendered both inside and outside
Canada may be apportioned between Canada and the other jurisdiction on the
basis of the time spent in each jurisdiction.181 For US tax purposes, Code section 863 authorizes the formulary determination of the source of specified types
of taxable income in order to allocate that income partly to the United States
and partly to foreign jurisdictions. Examples are income from the sale of goods
produced in the United States and sold abroad, and vice versa, income from
transportation, and income from communications. The Income Tax Act of Singapore182 allows the use of a formula in determining domestic-source income
from international shipping.
Formulary allocation is also used to determine the amount of expenses to
be deducted in the computation of taxable income. Examples (discussed above)
are the limitation of interest expense deductions in the case of thin capitalization and branch interest allocation rules in Canada, China, and United States.
Moreover, formulary allocation is used in computing tax (not profit). For
example, in Canada, formulary allocation is used to determine the amount of
the manufacturing and processing tax credit.183 Many countries use formulas to
impose limitations on the amount of foreign tax credit.184
Formulary Allocation and the Arm’s-Length Principle
The OECD transfer-pricing guidelines do not seem to reject the use of formulary
allocation in the circumstances described above. According to the guidelines,
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profit-split methods are different from global formulary apportionment because
they “compare, on a case-by-case basis, the profits of one or more associated
enterprises with the profit experience that comparable independent enterprises
would have sought to achieve in comparable circumstances.”185 Formula-based
APAs are consistent with the arm’s-length principle because the formula “is
derived from the particular facts and circumstances of the taxpayer.”186 The formulary allocation methods for attributing profits to permanent establishments
under article 7(4) of the OECD model are consistent with the arm’s-length principle because “the method of apportionment adopted shall . . . be such that the
result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in . . . Article [7].”187
These attempts show that “the OECD accepts the existing provisions of the
model as untouchable and, as a result, it bends them out of shape to accommodate new developments.”188 They may also indicate that the OECD’s traditional
interpretation of article 9 was too rigid in the first place and that the drift
toward formulary allocation is inevitable.

Global Profit Split: Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages
In addition to the argument that the proposed GPS method is consistent with the
arm’s-length approach embodied in article 9(1) of the OECD model, the GPS is
superior to the existing system in the following ways:
•
•
•
•

it promotes inter-nation fairness,
it is consistent with economic theories,
it can overcome the tax haven problem, and
it respects the principle of simplicity.

Consistency with the Arm’s-Length Principle
Article 9(1) of the OECD model was intended to allocate the income of an MNE
among countries in which the MNE conducts its business operations. As argued
in chapter 12, under the heading “Questionable Interpretation of Article 9(1) of
the OECD Model,” the traditional interpretation of this provision to require the
use of the comparable transactional pricing approach is not warranted either by
its object and purpose or by its wording. Although an arm’s-length price is one
means of satisfying an arm’s-length principle, it is not the only means. Allocation of profit on the basis of formulas in the circumstances described under the
heading “Current Uses of Formulary Allocation” has been largely accepted as
being consistent with the arm’s-length principle. Therefore, a strong argument
can be made that article 9(1) does not compel the use of comparable pricing
methodologies to the exclusion of formula-based methods. The comparable
transactional pricing approach and formulary allocation should not be viewed
as polar extremes; rather, both should be viewed as part of a continuum of
methods, designed to implement the arm’s-length principle. The GPS method is
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thus arguably consistent with the arm’s-length principle as stated in article 9(1)
of the OECD model.
Inter-Nation Fairness
The proposed GPS method would achieve a more equitable allocation of income
among jurisdictions. Market countries that provide a consumer base and countries
that provide a manufacturing base, as well as capital-exporting and technologically advanced countries, could all share in the taxation of the global profit
(including the residual profit) of MNEs. The factors of the GPS formula could
be designed to recognize the contributions made by all these countries. Residual
profit would not be allocated solely to the country where intangibles are
“owned” (often a tax haven) or “developed” (usually a developed country).189
Moreover, developing countries that typically have limited resources to
apply the complex existing transfer-pricing methods could receive a share of
global profit without incurring extra expenses. They could rely on the tax base
computed by another country and compute an appropriate percentage based on
the information available locally. This approach is not perfect, but it would be
an improvement over current practice.
Theoretical Correctness
The main advantage of the proposed GPS method over the existing arm’s-length
methods is that it is economically logical. It would be a conceptual improvement
over the status quo because it recognizes economic reality: MNEs’ businesses
are globally integrated, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.190 The
proposed method can fairly allocate the residual profit of an MNE to all participants in an integrated business. It is thus superior to existing methods, which
either cannot account for residual profit (in the case of transactional methods)
or cannot fairly allocate it. Even the OECD transfer-pricing guidelines, while
rejecting “global formulary apportionment” as an alternative to the arm’s-length
principle on mainly political and pragmatic grounds, seem to admit that formulary allocation is more in keeping with economic reality.191
The proposed GPS method would also be justified on the grounds of economic allegiance or benefit theory. The idea of “formula split” was raised by
Georg von Schanz in 1892, when he suggested a 75:25 split between source
and residence countries on the basis of benefit theory.192 Thirty years later,
economists appointed by the League of Nations suggested that two countries
might agree by treaty to develop reciprocal rules of origin or source for specific
classes of income and to reciprocally apply only a percentage of their normal
rates of tax to such income.193 The goal of this proposal was to effect a division
of the tax revenue from international income approximating that which would
occur if each country’s economic interest in the income could be quantified
using an economic allegiance analysis. Subsequent developments under the
auspices of the League of Nations and the OECD were essentially an attempt to
find conceptual and pragmatic hooks upon which to hang what the participants
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recognized to be an acceptably fair split along these lines.194 The proposed GPS
seeks to apportion the taxpayer’s income from an integrated business among
jurisdictions according to a formula designed to measure the substantiality of
the connection between the income and each jurisdiction with a legitimate claim
to tax that income. It is thus supported by well-accepted theories of international taxation.
Overcoming the Tax Haven Problem
The proposed GPS method would eliminate the attractiveness of traditional tax
havens, because no profit would be allocated to them. This feature of the GPS is
particularly important in respect of intangibles195 and in an e-commerce context.
In an electronic commerce environment, not only are the existing transfer-pricing
methods inadequate to prevent the shifting of income to tax haven entities, but
existing anti-avoidance rules (such as the CFC rules) also are ineffective.196 The
main reason is that the character of e-commerce transactions blurs the distinction between “active business income,” which is not subject to the CFC rules,
and “passive income” or “base company income,” which is the target of such
measures.197 Under the GPS method, income from integrated business activities
would be allocated in accordance with the formula. Because traditional tax
havens typically have no consumer base, manufacturing facility, or research
and development activities, no profit would be allocated to entities in these
countries. Even if sales or other factors could be sited to tax havens, the throwout
rule would exclude tax haven entities from the allocation of global profit.
In the case of the so-called production havens where the corporate tax rate
is low (for example, China, Singapore, and Ireland), the GPS would allocate a
portion of the global profit to such jurisdictions. This result would be consistent
with benefit theory and the principle of inter-nation fairness, since there are
genuine economic connections between these jurisdictions and the earning of
the global profit. It would also respect the sovereign rights of these jurisdictions
to impose tax on income earned within their borders, at whatever rates they
choose to adopt.
Simplification
A transition from the current comparable transactional pricing methods to the
proposed GPS method would inevitably involve some complexity. Once the
transition is over, the GPS system would greatly simplify the international tax
system, for the following reasons:
1) The GPS would replace the existing complex transfer-pricing methods
and eliminate subjectivity and the case-by-case approach required by
those methods.
2) The GPS would not totally depend on the determination of the residence
of MNEs. Because the concept of corporate residence is elusive, taxing
the income of MNEs under the GPS would provide more certainty and
simplicity.
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3) The built-in anti-tax-haven mechanism of the GPS, applied in combination with the proposed source withholding, would virtually eliminate the
need for CFC rules. Since these rules are a main cause of complexity,
their removal would undoubtedly simplify the tax system.
4) The GPS would tax the income of an integrated business in the source
country and provide strong policy reasons for the residence country (to
the extent that the residence of corporations remains relevant) to adopt the
exemption method in taxing foreign active income. The combination of
GPS and the exemption method would be much simpler than the current
system in providing relief for double taxation.
5) The GPS would simplify the determination of “permanent establishment”
and profit attribution to a permanent establishment. Once a permanent
establishment is found to exist, the amount of income allocated to it
would be determined in accordance with the formula.198
A further advantage of the GPS is that the consequent simplification of the tax
system would likely reduce compliance costs. This feature should make the GPS
attractive to MNEs. While the GPS may impose significant reporting requirements
on integrated businesses, these requirements may be less onerous than those
imposed under the existing methodologies. For example, the traditional methods require the derivation of hypothetical prices for each of perhaps a multitude
of cross-border transactions, assuming that these are the “right” prices and then
assuming that the reported taxable income in each country as adjusted for these
prices constitutes the correct amount of taxable income for that country. Even
aside from the problem of determining the “right” price for each transaction,
the focus on the propriety of individual transactions, as opposed to the proper
amount of taxable income, multiplies substantially the number of questions that
must be answered and, correspondingly, the resources required to determine the
ultimate result. By contrast, the GPS method directly allocates global income
among the jurisdictions in which an integrated business operates, on the basis
of objective factors that each enterprise could ascertain for itself. Finally, with
regard to the expense of maintaining records for the proposed GPS method,
with the increasing capacity of computer technology and worldwide accounting
firms that service MNEs, and the computerization of accounting records, compliance with formulary apportionment requirements on a worldwide basis is not
the formidable task it once was.
It is possible that administrative costs under the proposed GPS system
would rise as a result of the need to audit members of an MNE group that are
not taxable in particular jurisdictions under the existing system. The additional
burden created by the increased audit coverage would be offset, however, by the
elimination of the need to pursue costly and complex investigations to monitor
planning opportunities under the existing transfer-pricing regime.
To conclude, the proposed GPS method enjoys several advantages over the
existing system for allocating international income. The GPS would be more
equitable in allocating income among jurisdictions and be more consistent with
both economic theory and the economic reality of how MNEs conduct their
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business. It could also help reduce tax incentives for shifting profit to tax havens.
In terms of the overall structure of the international tax system, the GPS, in
combination with the proposed UWT, would simplify the system by reducing the
need for other anti-avoidance rules that were designed to deal with problems
unresolved by the transfer-pricing approach. As Alex Easson has noted, there are
only two major issues in international taxation: transfer pricing and the rest.199
However, as discussed below, the GPS has some disadvantages that must be
thoroughly examined and, it is hoped, overcome before the method is adopted.

Disadvantages
Traditional formulary apportionment has been criticized as being arbitrary on the
ground that predetermined formulas cannot reflect the particular circumstances
of each MNE, and thereby cause double taxation.200 Transitional difficulties
have often been raised as a major disadvantage. Similar arguments may be made
against the proposed GPS. The merits of these arguments are discussed below.
Arbitrary Allocation
It has been argued that the use of predetermined factors makes formulary apportionment inconsistent with article 9 of the OECD model, since it may result
in the allocation of profits to a country in which profits were not earned.201
Although this objection is valid, it is hardly persuasive. A thoughtful design of the
formula would ensure at least a fairer and more accurate allocation of profits,
whereas the present methods are inherently inadequate because they allow profits to be sheltered from full taxation.202 Moreover, opponents of formulary
apportionment assume that the existing arm’s-length methods “correctly” allocate profits from integrated business. This assumption is incorrect. Benjamin
Miller writes:
Both the OECD and [opponents of the global formulary apportionment]
hold global formulary apportionment to the standards of a theoretical
world while absolving the arm’s-length method from not only a perfect
world, but also a real world, evaluation. In their eyes, it is apparently
enough that most nations pay lip service to the existence of an arm’s
length standard.203

Potential Double Taxation
In theory, under the proposed GPS method, there is a mathematical certainty of
no double taxation.204 In practice, double taxation could occur if countries could
not reach a consensus on the definition of “integrated business” and “global
profit,” or on the measurement and location of the factors in the formula. Even
in such cases, however, the problem could be dealt with by improving uniformity,
whereas the double taxation that is inherent under existing methods cannot be
eliminated through uniformity in implementation. As discussed in chapter 12,
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the purported current international consensus on the implementation of the
arm’s-length principle is very superficial. In fact, countries may apply different
methods to a transaction, producing different results and causing double taxation of income.205
Transition Difficulties
The key to any satisfactory solution to the problem of international taxation is
international consensus. The proposed GPS method is unlikely to be adopted as
an international norm unless it is accepted by both capital-importing countries
(typically developing countries) and capital-exporting countries (typically developed countries.)
First of all, there must be sufficient political will among participating
countries to make the transition. Countries will move to the new system only if
they think that it will bring better results. Obtaining broad acceptance of the
GPS method would be a major task, especially given that international taxation
is a zero-sum game. The GPS will not be accepted if countries perceive that its
adoption will put them in a losing position. This problem is even more significant if the United States and the EU countries are likely to be worse off under
the GPS. MNEs that stand to lose under the GPS also would oppose it, and they
often have significant lobbying power. The present system allows MNEs to
manipulate transfer prices to reduce their international tax liabilities. These
taxpayers, who may see their scope to avoid tax reduced by the GPS, would need
to be persuaded of the overriding benefits of the new system (such as simplification, certainty, and lower compliance costs). This would not be an easy task.
Assuming that international consensus could be achieved, making the transition from the current system to the proposed GPS would involve some difficulties. Both domestic legislation and administrative practices would need to be
amended. The question of national fiscal sovereignty and the legal mechanism
for countries to cooperate must be addressed. In addition, the accounting and
reporting systems of MNEs would need to be modified and improved in terms
of their transparency and reliability so that the type of fraud carried out by
Enron206 would be prevented. Nevertheless, there are several factors that would
help smooth the transition.
First, the profit-split method and other current applications of formulary
allocation should provide some precedents. Countries that impose income tax
on the worldwide income of domestic corporations and provide relief for foreign tax have experience with the translation of currencies and conversion of
accounting conventions. Such experience is directly applicable to the proposed
GPS method. More important, the implementation of formulary apportionment
by subnational governments in the United States and Canada may provide some
useful experience in designing and administering such a system.
A second factor is the trend toward global harmonization of accounting
standards. Profit from integrated businesses can be computed with a high degree
of uniformity among jurisdictions. Before the advent of electronic commerce,
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the harmonization of accounting standards had already become an important
factor in the capital market decisions of many companies. The boards of the
International Accounting Standards Committee and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions had agreed to develop common accounting
standards by 1998.207 Accounting conventions in the EU are standardized. In
addition, the Financial Accounting Standards Board is exploring areas in which
Canada, Mexico, Chile, and the United States can harmonize their accounting
standards.208 In terms of accounting for financial products, the rules have become more or less global.209 It is clear that globalization in capital markets has
encouraged the internationalization of accounting rules.
A third factor that would smooth the transition to GPS is the movement
toward the standardization of transfer-pricing documentation. For example, the
Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) released a uniform transferpricing documentation package to assist taxpayers in the efficient preparation
and maintenance of useful transfer-pricing documentation, and the timely production of such documentation upon request to PATA member tax administrations.210
PATA members agree that an MNE will satisfy each member country’s documentation requirements by complying with all of the principles contained in
this package. The package itself is based on the principles set forth in the OECD
transfer-pricing guidelines.211
Finally, the fact that the proposed GPS method enhances inter-nation fairness and represents incremental changes from existing methods should help
build international support for its adoption. If formulary apportionment were
adopted across the EU,212 other countries would certainly be more likely to
adopt it. This said, forging a worldwide consensus on the use of GPS would be
a formidable task. Fortunately, to the optimists at least, the time has come for
the next advance in the search for the optimal method of allocating and taxing
international income.

Developing an International Consensus
As is the case for the existing transfer-pricing methods, implementation of the
proposed GPS method requires a strong international consensus. At present,
such a consensus does not exist. However, there is no reason to believe that
international agreement could not be secured and maintained. On the contrary,
as discussed below, there seem to be sufficient political, technical, and institutional conditions to foster such consensus.
The GPS is not radically different from the current profit-split method. The
only major differences are that the former is an explicit formulary allocation
method, which uses defined factors, whereas the latter is implicit and uses flexible factors. The profit-split method has been accepted and applied in Canada,
Japan, the United States, and other countries. There is also evidence that competent authorities are actually using profit-split procedures with some frequency
and success in resolving transfer-pricing disputes.213 These precedents bode
well for the eventual international acceptance of the proposed GPS method.
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Both developed and developing countries have an interest in accepting the
proposed method. Under the GPS method, residual profit would be allocated to
the country where intangibles are developed (usually capital-exporting countries)
as well as to the country where products and services are sold (capital-importing
countries). By comparison, the existing methods allocate residual profit mainly
to capital-exporting countries. Therefore, the GPS favours destination-based
taxation by allocating a portion of residual profit to countries of sale. As noted
by Avi-Yonah, a rule that favours destination-based taxation is the most likely
candidate to gain international acceptance.214
Capital-exporting countries would also obtain a fair share of residual profit.215
In theory, they may not get as much as they do under the existing system, since
a portion of the profit would be allocated to market countries and production
countries. However, the GPS would allocate income that is currently artificially
shifted to tax havens back to the countries where income-earning activities
occur. The recovered income would be allocated, at least substantially, to countries where intangibles are developed and produced.
There has been a gradual and steady movement toward greater international cooperation on taxation issues. The need for it has been well identified
and appreciated. Some commentators have called for the establishment of a multinational tax organization. The OECD has assumed the role of an international
tax body, especially in the areas of transfer pricing and electronic commerce. It
has also recently invited non-members to participate in its work. The OECD
might be persuaded to change its current stance on transfer pricing and take the
initiative in exploring the implementation of the GPS.
The historical development of the arm’s-length principle suggests a path
toward achieving consensus on this issue: the United States takes the lead, the
OECD and its members reach a compromise, and the rest of the world follows
the OECD. In fact, the United States may have already taken the lead by introducing the global dealing regulations. The EU has also opened the debate on the
use of formulary allocation as a means of eliminating tax obstacles for EUbased companies. If the United States and the EU were in agreement, the OECD
would soon follow. It is only hoped that the world of international taxation will
not have to wait too long to catch up with the world of international business.

Conclusions
In order to deal with the fundamental problems inherent in the present system
of (not) taxing income from cross-border transactions, this chapter has proposed a system consisting of a UWT on portfolio income and a GPS method of
allocating profits of integrated businesses. The proposed system is guided by
the principles of inter-nation fairness and single taxation. It would be naïve to
believe that the proposed system is problem-free. One big problem is that formulary allocation is unlikely to be adopted worldwide, or by OECD countries in
the near future—though it will be interesting to see what happens in the EU.216
In the meantime, the proposed UWT and GPS are not necessarily interdependent
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in their implementation, and each could be adopted on its own. The UWT could
be relatively easy to get agreement on and could, in any event, be introduced
unilaterally. In contrast, the proposed GPS is difficult to introduce unilaterally.
Even if there were general agreement about its superiority, it might be impossible to achieve consensus on the formula. It is worth emphasizing, however, that
the proposed UWT need not be rejected simply because adoption of the proposed GPS proves unlikely in the near future.
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